We investigate the performance of winners and losers for German equity mutual funds (1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009) using empirical order statistics. When using gross returns and the Fama-French three factor (3F) model, the number of statistically significant positive-alpha funds is zero but increases markedly when market timing variables are added. However, when using a "total performance" measure (which incorporates both alpha and the contribution of market timing), the number of statistically significant winner funds falls to zero. The latter is consistent with bias in estimated alphas in the presence of market timing. We also find that many poorly performing funds are unskilled rather than unlucky.
Introduction
The performance of individual US and UK mutual funds has been extensively analyzed.
On balance, studies find relatively weak evidence of positive alpha performance ("selectivity") in the extreme right tail of the cross-section performance distribution and relatively strong evidence of negative alpha performance throughout the left tail (e.g. Malkiel 1995 , Kosowski et al 2006 , Cuthbertson et al 2008 , 2010a , Fama and French 2010 . Successful market timing involves fund managers increasing (decreasing) their fund's market-beta in anticipation of an increase (decrease) in market returns. Evidence for successful market timing in both parametric and nonparametric studies has been found (for the US see for example, Treynor and Mazuy 1966 , Henriksson and Merton 1981 , Ferson and Schadt 1996 , Busse 1999 , Becker et al 1999 There has been little work done on analysing the performance of the German mutual fund industry despite its substantial growth over the last 15 to 20 years. Although the German mutual fund industry is small compared to the US, its assets under management peaked in 2007 at $372bn and fell to $237bn at end of 2008. However, it is expected that the German mutual fund industry will become more important in future years as reforms to private pension provision place greater emphasis on defined contribution pensions (i.e. 'Riester Rente') and reforms result in a less generous state pension. Krahner et al (2006) analysed 13 German domestic equity funds (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) , Stehle and Grewe (2001) analysed 18 equity funds (1973 to 1998), Griese and Kempf (2003) use 123 equity funds (1980 to 2000) and all find no positive statistically significant alphas. Otten and Bams (2002) analyse the performance of 4 portfolios of German equity funds and find predominantly negative and statistically insignificant alphas. Bessler, Drobetz and Zimmermann (2009) use an (unconditional and conditional) CAPM, a 3 factor Fama-French model and an SDF model on 50
German domestic equity funds (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and find statistically significant underperformance and no outperformance, particularly for the SDF model. Non of these studies examines market timing.
Many newspapers and trade journals present performance results in the form of league tables, so they too emphasize funds in the tails of the cross-section distribution. This gives rise to two major problems. First, because we are dealing with ordered/ranked funds, the performance distribution for a particular ranked fund (e.g. the best, or 2 nd best, etc) differs from that of the parent distribution. For example, if the cross-section of funds' "true" alphas are normally distributed with a mean of zero, and a sample of n-funds is drawn from this distribution, then the distribution of the fund with the largest alpha (ie. the best performing fund) will be non-normal with a positive mean. Second, if the performance statistic (alpha) for different funds have unknown and different underlying distributions, then the performance distribution of a particular percentile fund (e.g. the best fund) has to be obtained empirically
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. The contribution of this paper is to derive the empirical distributions for individual funds in the tails of the performance distribution, for a large number of German equity mutual funds using 20 years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ) of monthly data, for alternative factor models (including market timing effects) and bootstrap procedures. We use both alpha ("selectivity") as our performance measure and a measure of "total performance" ( i perf ) which combines both the fund's alpha and the contribution of market timing to fund returns.
When using gross returns and the Fama-French three factor (3F) model, the number of statistically significant positive alpha funds is zero but increases markedly when market timing variables are added. However, when using a "total performance" measure (which incorporates alpha and the contribution of market timing), the number of statistically significant winner funds falls to zero. The latter is consistent with bias in estimated alphas in the presence of market timing. Our results therefore suggest that extreme caution should be used when assessing skill purely in terms of "selectivity" when market timing is present and that in these circumstances a better and more robust metric is "total performance". We also find that many poorly performing funds are genuinely unskilled (rather than unlucky) when using either selectivity (alpha, in the 3F-model) or a total performance measure (in a market timing model).
Results for winner funds are consistent with the Berk and Green (2004) competitive equilibrium model (with decreasing returns to scale based on fund size) -but the presence of many statistically significant unskilled funds is not. However, the latter result may be partly rationalized in the theoretical model of Pastor and Stambaugh (2010) where decreasing returns to scale apply to the size of the active fund industry as a whole. They find that even when industry average performance is negative, the size of the active mutual fund industry may remain large and also far from its equilibrium. In such circumstances it may possible to observe large statistically significant negative performance statistics over considerable time periods because
The theory of order statistics deals with the relationship between the underlying distribution of possible outcomes (e.g. normal) and the distribution of say the maximum value from a sample of size n. Analytic results are only available if the underlying distributions are known. learning about the true parameters governing decreasing returns to scale and hence future performance is slow -in short, inertia in information processing results in investors continuing to hold poorly performing funds 2 .
Methodology and Performance
A cross-section bootstrap procedure is used to separate 'skill' from 'luck' for individual ranked funds, when idiosyncratic risks are highly non-normal (Kosowski et al 2006) . Consider an estimated model of equilibrium returns of the form: 
. This is repeated for all funds in our sample. This gives simulated returns for all funds under the null of zero alphas, for the first run of the bootstrap (B=1).
Next, using the simulated returns Pastor and Stambaugh's (2010) model focuses on the relationship between the size of the mutual fund industry and industry average performance, rather than on individual fund performance. It is therefore likely that persistently poor performance by some funds also requires an assumption of "frictions" in the ability to switch from poorly performing to potential winner funds. Other explanations of long-term negative performance include pure inertia, influences of broker and manager advertising and tax considerations (Gruber, 1996) or negative performance as a payoff for countercyclical performance (Glode, 2009) or that investors buy and sell actual index funds at the wrong time, and passive indices do not reflect this (Savov 2009). funds which gives a separate 'luck distribution' for each of the ordered funds () i f  in the performance distribution -from the best alpha-performer to the worst alpha-performer, all of which are solely due to luck. , we reject the null that its performance is due to luck (at 95% confidence) and infer that the fund has skill. This above procedure can be applied to a fund at any percentile of the performance distribution, right down to the ex-post worst performing fund. A key element of the approach is that under the null of zero alpha, we do not assume the distribution of the estimated alpha for each fund is normal. Each fund's alpha can follow any distribution (depending on the fund's residuals) and this distribution can be different for each fund. Hence the distribution under the
, encapsulates all of the different individual fund's empirical 'luck distributions' (and in a multivariate context this cannot be derived analytically from the theory of order statistics). We can also repeat the above bootstrap analysis for the t-statistic of alpha i t  which gives more robust inference in the extreme tails (Kosowski et al 2006) 3 .
Our alternative performance models are well known 'factor models'. The Fama and French (1993) 3F-model is: Coles et al (2006) show that although these individual biases are large, they are almost offsetting and they suggest using a measure of "total performance", when market timing is present. We use the Bollen and Busse (2004) measure of total performance.
[4]
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Data and Empirical Results
We use a comprehensive, monthly data set (free of survivorship bias) over 20 years (January 1990 to December 2009) for 555 German domiciled equity mutual funds (each with at least 24 monthly observations) 4 of which 85 invest solely in German equities, with the remainder investing outside Germany ("European" and "Global"). Gross returns are returns to the fund (i.e.
before deduction of expenses) while net returns are (before-tax) returns to investors (i.e. after deduction of management fees). we discard about 85 funds in our complete sample of 619 funds, of which about 45 of the funds discarded are "live" and 40 are "dead" funds and those discarded are mainly from funds invested with a European and Global mandate, rather than funds which invest in German stocks. Our sample of 555 funds (with T ≥ 24) consists of 364 "surviving funds" and 119 "dead funds".
Average management fees and the spread of fees across funds and fund styles are similar and are also reasonably constant over time (Table 1 , Panel B). . Around 545 funds (from our 555) have statistically significant positive market betas (10% significance level). For the SMB factor around 420 funds are significantly positive while 17 funds have negative and statistically significant SMB-betas.
The number of significant positive HML-betas is 103, with 247 having significant negative betas.
Hence many more German funds invest in small rather than large stocks and are "growth orientated" rather than value orientated. For the 3F+TM model, we have 60 (158) funds with a statistically significant positive (negative) market timing coefficient i
We concentrate on
4
The data set is from Bloomberg and consists of over 600 funds. This is reduced to just 555 after stripping out second units and funds with less than 2 years of data history.
5
We do not have data on the Carhart (1997) momentum factor for those German domiciled funds who invest only in Germany and the much larger number who invest outside Germany.
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The above results also apply when gross returns (i.e. returns before deduction of fees) are used. This is because fees are relatively constant over time. [ Table 2 -here]
Winner Funds
The average management fee is 1.22% p.a. with a standard deviation (across funds) of 0.46 and is fairly constant over time. Below, we report results using gross returns (i.e. before deduction of management fees) -if a fund cannot achieve a statistically significant positive performance or has a negative performance in terms of gross returns, then such funds provide an even worse performance in terms of net returns to investors.
After applying the cross-section bootstrap there are about 250 (out of 555) funds with positive alpha-performance statistics, across the different specifications. Table 3 (Panel A) reports alpha and t-alpha statistics (together with their bootstrap p-values ) for funds at chosen percentiles, after ranking funds by each of these performance statistics, using the unconditional 3F model. "Alpha sort" is the value of alpha for a specific fund at a chosen percentile, after all funds' alphas have been sorted from highest to lowest. "t-alpha sort" is defined analogously for the t-statistic of alpha. The 3F model gives no statistically significant positive-alpha funds (at a 5% significance level) -whether we use alpha or t-alpha as our performance statistic (Table 3 , Panel A).
We now examine alpha-performance in the 3F model with the addition of the TM market timing variable, 2 , mt r . First, there is a dramatic increase in the number of statistically significant positive-alpha funds to around 200-240, and in the size of the alphas. This is illustrated in figure 1 where the kernel density for the estimated (non-ordered) alphas in the 3F+TM model (dashed line) lies to the right of the alpha estimates in the 3F-model (solid line).
We can compare the alpha and t-alpha performance of individual funds at particular percentiles of the performance distribution using the 3F model (Table 3 , Panel A) and the 3F+TM market timing model (Table 3 , Panel B). For example, using the 3F model (Table 3 , Panel A), the fund ranked by alpha at the 10th percentile ("top10%") the value of alpha is 3.2% p.a. (p=0.97) but this increases to 6.8% (p = 0.0007) in the 3F+TM model (Panel B). Using t-alpha as the performance measure a similar increase occurs, as we add the TM market timing variable to the 3F model. For example, taking the fund ranked by t-alpha at the 10th percentile, the value of t-alpha is 1.16 (p=0.99) for the 3F model (Panel A) whereas for the market timing model t-alpha increases to 1.70 (p 1999) . In addition, spurious timing effects can arise from option-like characteristics (Jagannathan and Korajczyk 1986) , and interim trading (Goetzmann et al 2000, Ferson and Khang 2002) , while "artificial timing bias" can arise even in "synthetic passive portfolios" (Bollen and Busse 2001 ). Hence we cannot rule out the possibility that some of our timing coefficients may be spurious. Table 3 . It would appear that the market timing model (Panel B) provides much stronger evidence of successful security selection skills than the 3F model (Panel A).
<0.0001). This pattern of results occurs for all positive alpha funds reported in
[ Figure 1 -here] [ Table 3 -here] However, using the 3F+TM model, and our measure of total performance -which combines the effect on returns of both security selection and market timing -we again find no (statistically significant) skilled funds whether we rank funds by i perf or perf t . This is shown in Table 3 for the 3F+TM model, shows that for funds at specific percentiles, positive alpha- performance" for all actively managed German equity mutual funds is solely due to luck, not skill.
[ Figure 2 -here]
Overall, we conclude that there are no statistically significant "winner funds", even before deduction of management fees. This is because we discount the statistically significant results on selectivity (alpha) in the 3F+TM model which are subject to potential bias and because i perf is a sensible performance metric in the presence of market timing 8 .
Loser Funds
Using gross returns we have a large number of funds that are unskilled whatever performance metric or factor model we use. At a 5% significance level, we find 317 unskilled funds based on the ordered bootstrap t-alpha of the 3F-model, 61 based on the order bootstrap talpha of the 3F+TM model and 222 based on the bootstrap t-statistic of i perf -out of a total of 555 funds. These performance results are model dependent but potential biases in alpha when market timing is present, suggests concentrating on the negative alphas from the 3F model (Table 3 , Panel A) or negative values for our total performance measure, i perf (Table 3 , Panel C).
For the 3F-model, the ranked alphas and t-alphas for nearly all the percentile funds reported in the right-hand side of Panel A are negative and statistically significant (based on bootstrap p-values). However, funds located at specific percentiles reported for the worst performers in Table 3 For alpha-performance in the 3F model and total performance in the 3F+TM model both performance measures clearly show that many loser funds are unskilled rather than unlucky.
Despite the existence of low cost passive funds (either constructed from sector index mutual funds or ETFs), German investors continue to hold a large number of active funds which deliver a statistically significant negative abnormal performance (either in terms of alpha or total performance) -competition for investment funds does not appear to remove poorly performing funds from the marketplace. This may have serious consequences as Germany moves from a 8 Using net returns (i.e. after deduction of management fees) this result applies a fortiori for alpha in the 3F model and for i perf in the 3F+TM model. Hence potential "winner" funds with either positive alpha or positive i perf are merely lucky rather than exhibiting true (statistically significant) outperformance, for all ordered funds -these results are available on request. 9 Using net returns to investors, the equivalent results for negative performers for all three models (not reported) have pvalues less than 0.01 -hence not surprisingly, there are a substantial number of loser funds which are genuinely unskilled rather than unlucky. predominantly state provided pensions system to pensions based (in part) on stock market performance.
Conclusions
At a methodological level, our results suggest that one should not assess "skill" purely in terms of "selectivity" (alpha) when market timing is present, since estimation bias is likely to be substantial. In the presence of market timing a more useful and robust metric is "total performance" (which incorporates selectivity and the contribution to returns of successful market timing).
Comparing results on security selection (alpha) in the 3F model (i.e. excluding market timing) with results using our measure of total performance i perf in the 3F+TM model, we find that even in the tails of the performance distribution both measures give a consistent picture for German equity mutual fund investors. For funds with an estimated positive net return performance (to investors), either due solely to alpha or in terms of total performance (in the presence of market timing) -all funds are merely lucky rather than exhibiting skill. But for nearly all funds with negative estimated alphas (in the 3F model) or total performance (in the market timing model) these funds are genuinely unskilled, rather than unlucky.
When we add back fees, then for alpha in the 3F model and total performance in the 3F+TM model there are still no skilled funds even in the extreme right tail of the performance distribution but there are a substantial number of funds that are unskilled, delivering statistically significant negative abnormal performance (either alpha or total performance) before fees, and these funds are spread throughout much of the left tail of the performance distribution.
The message for German investors is clear -avoid active equity mutual funds and diversify using index tracker funds or ETFs. observations. Returns are net of management fees. The average number of observations used is 111 months. We report averages of the individual fund statistics for three different models (3F, and the 3F+TM and 3F+HM market timing models). The first factor is the corresponding excess market return m r , the second factor is the size factor SMB, and the third factor is the book-to-market factor, HML. t-statistics are based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors. BJ is the Bera-Jarque statistic for normality of residuals. This table reports performance measures for the full sample of ordered funds using gross returns (ie. before deduction of management fees). Panel A reports alpha and t-alpha statistics from the unconditional 3F model for various percentiles of the performance distribution, together with their bootstrap p-values. Panel B repeats this for alpha and t-alpha in the 3F+TM market timing model, while Panel C does so for the total performance measure perf and perf t statistics (also using the 3F+TM model). "Fund's rank" is the numerical position of the fund (out of a total of 555 funds) when a particular performance statistic (e.g. alpha) is used to rank funds from highest to lowest. For example, the fund at the 1st percentile ("Top 1%") is the fund ranked 6th out of 555 funds. "Alpha sort" is the value of alpha for a specific fund at a chosen percentile, after all funds' alphas have been sorted from highest to lowest. "t-alpha sort" is defined analogously for the tstatistic of alpha. "Perf sort" and "t-perf sort" are defined analogously to "alpha sort" and "t-alpha sort" -but funds are ranked using the total performance measures perf or perf t . Both actual (ex-post) and bootstrap t-statistics are based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors. The sample period is January 1990 to December 2009 (monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled mutual funds which have at least 24 observations. 
